BERNARD SALANIE THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS PDF
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Salanie, Bernard. [Theorie des contrats. English]. The economics of contracts: primer / Bernard Salanie. By Bernard Salanié; Abstract: The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. Article · January with 99 Reads. Cite this publication. Bernard Salanie at Columbia University. Bernard Salanie.
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Journal of Political Economy ecomomics, Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Estimating preferences under risk: Estimation of multi-market fix-price models: This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists.
Should more risk-averse agents exert more effort? Email address for updates.
Search for items with the same title. Here is how to contribute. An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chapters 4 and 6.
The Economics of Contracts: Is your work missing from RePEc? For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter 3, on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes more thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter 5, on vernard hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics.
Bernard Salanie – Google Scholar Citations
Professor of Economics, Columbia University. New articles related to this author’s research. This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Articles 1—20 Show more. New articles by this author.
EconPapers: The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Articles Contracrs by Co-authors. Exercises follow chapters 2 through 5. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: Two chapters have been completely rewritten: The following articles are merged in Scholar. The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries.
The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard. Get my own profile Cited by View all All Since Citations h-index 39 27 iindex 69 This “Cited by” count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar.
Amit Gandhi University of Pennsylvania Verified email salaniee upenn. Title Cited by Year The economics of contracts: The system can’t perform the operation now.
The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition, vol 1
Journal of Applied Econometrics 17 1, My profile My library Metrics Alerts. Koen Jochmans University of Cambridge Verified email at cam. Screening th agents under moral hazard: The economics of contracts: Journal of the Econometric Society, It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics.
Marc Henry Professor of Economics Verified email at psu. Does fertility respond to financial incentives? The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own. Verified email at columbia. New citations to this author.
Asymmetric information in insurance: D86 C70 search for similar items in EconPapers Date: